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Abstract. Proper consistency is deﬁned by the properties that each
player takes all opponent strategies into account (is cautious) and deems
one opponent strategy to be inﬁnitely more likely than another if the
opponent prefers the one to the other (respects preferences). When there
is common certain belief of proper consistency, a most preferred strategy
is properly rationalizable. Any strategy used with positive probability
in a proper equilibriumis properly rationalizable. Only strategies that
lead to the backward induction outcome is properly rationalizable in the
strategic form of a generic perfect information game. Proper rationaliz-
ability can be used to test the robustness of inductive procedures. JEL
Classiﬁcation Number: C72.
1. Introduction
Most contributions on the relation between common knowledge/belief of
rationality and backward induction in perfect information games perform
the analysis in the extensive form of the game. An exception to this rule is
Schuhmacher [24] who — based on Myerson’s [22] concept of a proper equi-
librium, but without making equilibrium assumptions — deﬁnes the concept
of proper rationalizability in the strategic form and shows that proper ratio-
nalizable play leads to backward induction. Schuhmacher deﬁnes the set of
properly rationalizable strategy vectors to be the limit of the set of  -properly
rationalizable strategy vectors, where the concept of  -proper rationalizabil-
ity is based on players doing mistakes, but where more costly mistakes are
made with a much smaller probability than less costly ones. For a given
 , he oﬀers an epistemic foundation for  -proper rationalizability. However,
for the limiting concept, i.e. proper rationalizability, there has not been
an epistemic foundation available. It is the purpose of the present paper
to establish how common certain belief of proper consistency characterizes
proper rationalizability in strategic two-player games.
Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel [9] characterize proper equilibrium as a
property of preferences. When doing so they represent the preferences of
players by the concept of a lexicographic probability system (LPS; Blume,
Brandenburger & Dekel [8]), which allows a player to deem one opponent
strategy to be inﬁnitely more likely than another while still taking the latter
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strategy into account. In two-player games, their characterization of proper
equilibrium can be described by the following two properties.
1. Each player is certain of the LPS of his opponent,
2. Each player’s LPS satisﬁes that the player takes all opponent strategies
into account (is cautious) and that the player deems one opponent
strategy to be inﬁnitely more likely than another if the opponent prefers
the one to the other (respects preferences).
In my characterization of proper rationalizability in two-player games I drop
property 1., which is an equilibrium assumption; instead I assume that there
is common certain belief of property 2., which I call proper consistency.
Since, in my framework, a player is not certain of the LPS of his opponent,
player i’s LPS must be deﬁned on Sj × Tj, where Sj denotes the set of
opponent strategies and Tj denotes the set of opponent types. Each type
of player i is simply an LPS on Sj × Tj.At y p eti is said to be cautious if
ti takes into account all strategies of any opponent type that is not deemed
Savage-null. A type ti is said to respect preferences if, for any opponent type
that is not deemed Savage-null, ti deems one strategy of the opponent type
to be inﬁnitely more likely than another if the opponent type prefers the one
to the other. A type ti is said to be properly consistent with the preferences
of his opponent if ti is both cautious and respects preferences. Hence, the
present analysis follows Asheim & Dufwenberg [4] (AD) by suggesting that
in deductive game theory, requirements can be imposed on the beliefs of
players rather than their choice. Since the beliefs of players determine their
preferences, this amounts to imposing requirements on preferences.1 At y p e
ti certainly believes the event that his opponent is of a type that is properly
consistent if he deems Savage-null any opponent type that is not properly
consistent. There is common certain belief of proper consistency at t =
(t1,t 2) if both t1 and t2 certainly believes the event that his opponent is
of a type that is properly consistent, they both certainly believes that his
opponent certainly believes the event that his opponent is of a type that is
properly consistent, etc.
A pure strategy si is called properly rationalizable if there is a set of type
vectors T = T1 × T2 with common certain belief of proper consistency at
t =( t1,t 2) such that si is a most preferred strategy given ti’s LPS. It is the
ﬁrst main result that any pure strategy used with positive probability in a
proper equilibrium is properly rationalizable. The second main result is that
the present paper’s deﬁnition of proper rationalizability corresponds to that
of Schuhmacher [24]: A pure strategy is properly rationalizable in the sense
1Instead of imposing rational choice in the sense that a driver chooses to drive on
the right side of the road if he believes that his opponent chooses to drive on the right
side of the road, AD suggest to impose consistent preferences in the sense that a driver
prefers to drive on the right side of the road if he believes that his opponent prefers to
drive on the right side of the road. This follows a tradition in equilibriumanalysis where
Nash (perfect/proper) equilibriumis deﬁned as an equilibriumin conjectures (cf. Blum e,





1, 1 1, 1 1, 0
1, 1 2, 2 2, 2
0, 1 2, 2 3, 3
Figure 1. Illustrating common certain belief of proper consistency
of the present paper if and only if it is used with positive probability in some
properly rationalizable mixed strategy in the sense of Schuhmacher [24]. The
third main result is to apply my deﬁnition to show that only strategies that
lead to the backward induction outcome are properly rationalizable in the
normal form of a generic perfect information game. Thus, Schuhmacher’s
Theorem 2 (which shows that the backward induction outcome obtains with
“high” probability for any given “small”  ) is strengthened, and an epistemic
foundation for the backward induction procedure (as an alternative to Au-
mann’s [5]) is provided. Lastly, it is illustrated through an example how
proper rationalizability can be used to test the robustness of inductive pro-
cedures.
The analysis is limited to 2-player games. The extension to general (n-
player) games raises the issue of whether (and if so, how) each player’s belief
about the strategy choices of the other players are stochastically indepen-
dent. This is outside the scope of the present paper.
2. An Illustration
The symmetric game of Fig. 1 is an example where common certain
belief of proper consistency is suﬃcient to determine completely each player’s
preferences over his or her own strategies. The game is due to Blume,
Brandenburger & Dekel ([9], Fig. 1).
In this game, caution implies that player 1 prefers M to U since M weakly
dominates U. Likewise, player 2 prefers C to L. Since 1 respects the pref-
erences of 2 and, in addition, certainly believes that 2 is cautious, it follows
that 1 deems C inﬁnitely more likely than L. This in turn implies that
1 prefers D to U. Likewise, since 2 respects the preferences of 1 and, in
addition, certainly believes that 1 is cautious, it follows that 2 prefers R to
L. As a consequence, since 1 respects the preferences of 2, certainly believes
that 2 respects the preferences of 1, and certainly believes that 2 certainly
believes that 1 is cautious, it follows that 1 deems R inﬁnitely more likely
than L. Consequently, 1 prefers D to M. A symmetric reasoning entails
that 2 prefers R to C. Hence, if there is common certain belief of proper
consistency, it follows that the players’ preferences over their own strategies
are given by
U ≺ M ≺ D
L ≺ C ≺ R.4 GEIR B. ASHEIM
The facts that D is the unique most preferred strategy for 1 and R is the
unique most preferred strategy for 2 means that only D and R are properly
rationalizable (cf. Def. 1 of Sect. 4.1). By Prop. 1 of Sect. 4.2, it then
follows that the pure strategy vector (D,R) is the unique proper equilib-
rium, which can easily be checked by inspection. However, note that in the
argument above, each player obtains certainty about the preferences of his
opponent through deductive reasoning; i.e. such certainty is not assumed as
in the concept of proper equilibrium.
The concept of proper rationalizability yields a strict reﬁnement of (or-
dinary) rationalizability. All strategies for both players are rationalizable,
which is implied by the fact that, in addition to (D,R), the pure strategy
vectors (U,L)a n d( M,C) are also Nash equilibria. The concept of proper
rationalizability yields even a strict reﬁnement when compared to the Dekel-
Fudenberg [14] procedure, which consists of one round of weak elimination
followed by iterated strong elimination, and which follows from there being
common certain belief of caution and belief of opponent rationality (see e.g.
Brandenburger [12] and B¨ orgers [11]). When the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure
is employed, only U is eliminated for 1, and only L is eliminated for 2, re-
ﬂecting that also the pure strategy vector (M,C) is a perfect equilibrium. It
is a general result that proper rationalizability reﬁnes the Dekel-Fudenberg
procedure (cf. Thm. 4of Herings & Vannetelbosch [18] as well as Remark
1 below).
3. States, Types, Preferences, and Belief
The purpose of this section is to present a framework for strategic games
where each player is modeled as a decision maker under uncertainty. The
decision-theoretic analysis builds on Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel [8].
The framework is summarized by the concept of a belief system (cf. Def. 1).
The Appendix contains a presentation of the decision-theoretic terminology,
notation and results that will be utilized.
3.1. A Strategic Game Form. With N = {1,2} as the set of players,
let Si denote player i’s ﬁnite set of pure strategies,a n dl e tz : S → Z map
strategy vectors into outcomes, where S = S1 × S2 is the set of strategy
vectors and Z is the set of outcomes. Then ((Si)i∈N,z) is a ﬁnite strategic
two-player game form.W r i t ep, r,a n ds (∈ S) for pure strategy vectors.
3.2. States and Types. When a strategic game form is turned into a
decision problem for each player (see Tan & Werlang [29]), the uncertainty
faced by a player concerns the strategy choice of his opponent, the belief of
his opponent about his own strategy choice, and so on. A type of a player
corresponds to a vNM utility function and a belief about the strategy choice
of his opponent, a belief about the belief of his opponent about his own
strategy choice, and so on.
Given an assumption of coherency, models of such inﬁnite hierarchies
of beliefs (Armbruster & B¨ oge [2], B¨ oge & Eisele [10], Mertens & ZamirPROPER CONSISTENCY 5
[20], Brandenburger & Dekel [13], Epstein & Wang [17]) yield S × T as the
complete state space, where S is the underlying space of uncertainty and
where T = T1 × T2 is the set of all feasible type vectors. Furthermore, for
each i, there is a homeomorphism between Ti and the set of beliefs on S×Tj,
where j denotes i’s opponent. Combined with a vNM utility function, the
set of beliefs on S × Tj corresponds to the set of “regular” binary relations
o nt h es e to fa c t so nS × Tj, where an act on S × Tj is a function that to
any element of S × Tj assigns an objective randomization on Z.
F o re a c ht y p eo fa n yp l a y e ri, the type’s decision problem is to choose one
of i’s strategies. For the modeling of this problem, the type’s belief about his
own decision is not relevant and can be ignored. Hence, models of inﬁnite
hierarchies of beliefs — in the setting of a strategic game form — imply that
each type of any player i corresponds to a “regular” binary relation on the
s e to fa c t so nSj × Tj.
In conformity with the literature on inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs, let
• the set of states of the world (or simply states)b eΩ: =S × T,
• each type ti of any player i correspond to a binary relation  ti on the
set of acts on Sj × Tj.
However, like AD, I do not construct a complete state space by explicitly
modeling inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs. For tractability I instead directly
consider an implicit model — with a ﬁnite type set Ti for each player i
— from which inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs can be constructed. Moreover,
since continuity is not imposed, the “regularity” conditions on  ti consist of
completeness, transitivity, objective independence, nontriviality, conditional
continuity and non-null state independence, meaning that  ti is represented
by a vNM utility function υ
ti
i : Z → R that assigns a payoﬀ to any outcome





Tj) (cf. Blume et al. [8] and the Appendix). Being a vNM utility function,
υ
ti
i can be extended to objective randomizations on Z.
The construction is summarized by the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1. A belief system for a game form ((Si)i∈N,z) consists of
• for each player i, a ﬁnite set of types Ti,
• for each type ti of any player i, a binary relation  ti (ti’s preferences)
on the set of acts on Sj×Tj , where  ti is represented by a vNM utility
function υ
ti
i on the set of objective randomizations on Z and an LPS
λti on Sj × Tj.
3.3. Certain Belief. For each player i, i’s certain belief can be derived
from the belief system. To state this epistemic operator, let, for each player
i and each state ω ∈ Ω, ti(ω) denote the projection of ω on Ti, and let, for
any E ⊆ Ω, E
ti




2) ∈ E s.t. (s 
j,t  
j)=
(sj,t j)a n dt 
i = ti} denote the set of opponent strategy-type pairs that are
consistent with ω ∈ E and ti(ω)=ti. Associate ‘certain belief’ of an event
with the property that no element of the complement of the event is assigned6 GEIR B. ASHEIM
positive probability by some probability distribution in λti:







j := suppλti (⊆ Sj × Tj) denotes the set of opponent strategy-type
pairs that ti does not deem Savage-null.2 Say that i certainly believes the





KE := K1E ∩ K2E. Say that there is mutual certain belief of E ⊆ Ωg i v e n
ω if ω ∈ KE.W r i t eCKE := KE ∩ KKE ∩ KKKE ∩ .... Say that there
is common certain belief of E ⊆ Ωg i v e nω if ω ∈ CKE.
3.4. Preferences over Strategies. Let  
ti
Sj denote the marginal of  ti
on Sj. A pure strategy si ∈ Si c a nb ev i e w e da sa na c txSj on Sj that
assigns z(si,s j)t oa n ysj ∈ Sj. Hence,  
ti
Sj is a binary relation also on
the subset of acts on Sj that correspond to i’s pure strategies. Thus,  
ti
Sj
can be referred to as ti’s preferences over i’s pure strategies.S i n c e  ti





i := {ri ∈ Si|∀si ∈ Si,r i  
ti
Sj si} denote ti’s set of most
preferred strategies (i.e. ti’s choice set).
3.5. A Strategic Game. Let, for each i, ui : S → R be a vNM utility
function that assigns payoﬀ to any strategy vector. Then G =( Si,u i)i∈N is
a ﬁnite strategic 2-player game. Assume that, for each i, there exist r, s ∈ S
such that ui(r) >u i(s). The event that i plays the game G is given by
[ui]: ={ω ∈ Ω|υ
ti(ω)
i ◦ z is a positive aﬃne transformation of ui},
while [u1] ∩ [u2] is the event that both players play G.
4. Consistency of Preferences
Usually requirements in deductive game theory are imposed on choice.
E.g. rationality is a requirement on a pair (si,t i), where si is said to be
a ‘rational choice’ by ti if si ∈ C
ti
i . See e.g. Epstein ([16], Sect. 6) for a
presentation of this approach in a general context.
The present paper follows AD by imposing requirements on ti only. Since
ti corresponds to the preferences  ti, such requirements will be imposed
on  ti. In support of this alternative approach — which will be referred
to by the term ‘consistent preferences’ — one can note the following: The
approach allows
• ... requirements to be imposed on types rather than strategy-type
pairs.
• ... conventional concepts like ‘rationalizable strategies’ and strategies
surviving the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure to be characterized under
weak and natural conditions (see e.g. Remark 1 below).
2The term‘certain belief’ for this notion is also used by Morris [21].PROPER CONSISTENCY 7
• ... requirements like caution and respect of opponent preferences to
be imposed in a straightforward manner. In order to accommodate
caution under the ‘rational choice’ approach, the notion of ‘certain
belief’ must be weakened (cf. B¨ orgers ([11], pp. 266–267) and Epstein
([16], p. 3)). It is unclear how respect of opponent preferences can be
accommodated under the ‘rational choice’ approach.
Here I will focus on showing how ‘consistent preferences’ as an approach
to deductive game theory can be used to deﬁne proper rationalizabiliy as a
non-equilibrium analogue to Myerson’s [22] proper equilibrium in 2-player
games.3 In the same way as Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel [9] characterize
proper equilibrium as an equilibrium in conjectures (which does not entail
that players tremble, but that each player takes into account the possibility
that the opponent can tremble), the present deﬁnition of proper rational-
izability stems from requirements on preferences. In particular, it diﬀers
from Schuhmacher’s [24] main statement of his deﬁnition by not modeling
players that tremble; instead each player takes into account the possibility
that the opponent can tremble, he certainly believes that his opponent takes
into account the possibility that he himself can tremble, and so on.4
4.1. Proper Consistency. Proper consistency will be based on three re-
quirements: The ﬁrst of these ensures that each player plays the game G,
the second requirement ensures that each player takes all opponent strate-
gies into account (is cautious), while the third requirement ensures that each
player deems one opponent strategy to be inﬁnitely more likely than another
if the opponent prefers the one to the other (respects preferences).
To impose these requirements, consider the following events
[caui]: ={ω ∈ Ω|κ
ti(ω)
j = Sj × T
ti(ω)
j }
[respi]: ={ω ∈ Ω|(rj,t j)   (sj,t j) acc. to  ti(ω)
whenever tj ∈ T
ti(ω)







j denotes the set of opponent types that ti does not
deem Savage-null, and where   means ‘inﬁnitely more likely’ (cf. the Ap-
pendix).
• If ω ∈ [caui], then (sj,t j) is not deemed Savage-null acc. to  ti(ω)
whenever tj is not deemed Savage-null. This means that, ∀(sj,t j) ∈
Sj × T
ti(ω)




2) ∈ Ω|(s 
j,t  
j)  =( sj,t j)} (cf. Dekel &
3As mentioned in the introduction, an extension to games with more than 2 players
raises the issue of independence, which will not be addressed here.
4In a concluding discussion, Schuhmacher [24] also considers deﬁning  -proper ratio-
nalizability by posing requirements on the players’ beliefs rather than on their mixed
strategies. His alternative formulation diﬀers from the one oﬀered in this section both
in terminology (by having ‘types’ refer to (si,t i) pairs) and in analysis (by more costly
trembles being deemed much less likely – rather than inﬁnitely less likely – than less costly
ones).8 GEIR B. ASHEIM
Gul’s [15] deﬁnition of caution). It implies that the marginal of  ti(ω)
on Sj (i.e., ti(ω)’s preferences over Si,  
ti(ω)
Sj ) is admissible on Sj.
• If ω ∈ [respi], then ti(ω) respects the preferences of any opponent type
that is not deemed Savage-null.
Say that i is properly consistent (with the game G and the preferences of his





i := [ui] ∩ [caui] ∩ [respi].




2 as the event of proper consistency. The
concept of properly rationalizable strategies can now be deﬁned as most
preferred strategies in states where there is common certain belief of proper
consistency.
Deﬁnition 2. A pure strategy ri for i is properly rationalizable in a ﬁnite
strategic two-player game G if there exists a belief system with ri ∈ C
ti(ω)
i
for some ω ∈ CKAprop.
4.2. Results. It follows from Blume et al.’s [9] characterization of proper
equilibrium in two-player games that any strategy used with positive prob-
ability in a proper equilibrium is properly rationalizable.
Proposition 1. If (x1,x 2) ∈ ∆(S1) × ∆(S2) is a proper equilibrium in a
ﬁnite strategic two-player game G, then, for each i,a n ysi ∈ suppxi is
properly rationalizable.
Proof. Let (x1,x 2) be a proper equilibrium. By Blume et al.’s [9] Prop. 5, there
exists a pair of preferences,  t1 and  t2, that are represented by υ
t1
1 and λt1 =
(µ
t1
1 ,...) ∈ L∆(S2 ×{ t2}), and υ
t2
2 and λt2 =( µ
t2
1 ,...) ∈ L∆(S1 ×{ t1}), respec-
tively — with υ
t1
1 ◦ z = u1 and, ∀s2 ∈ S2, µ
t1
1 (s2,t 2)=x2(s2), and υ
t2
2 ◦ z = u2
and, ∀s1 ∈ S1, µ
t2
1 (s1,t 1)=x1(s1) — such that t1 and t2 are cautious and re-
spect preferences. Moreover, ∀i ∈ N, suppxi ⊆ C
ti
i .L e t Ω = S ×{ t1}×{ t2}.




In the construction of the proof, each player certainly believes the preferences
of his opponent. This is an equilibrium assumption, which is not satisﬁed
in general when there is common certain belief of proper consistency.
Since a proper equilibrium always exists, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. In any ﬁnite strategic two-player game G, there exists a belief
system with CKAprop  = ∅, implying that there exists, for each i, a nonempty
set of properly rationalizable strategies.
Remark 1. Substitute the event
Bi[ratj]: ={ω ∈ Ω|(rj,t j) ∈ suppµ
ti(ω)
1 implies rj ∈ C
tj
j }
for [respi], where µ
ti(ω)
1 is the primary probability distribution in ti(ω)’s
LPS, λti(ω).W r i t eAi := [ui] ∩ [caui] ∩ Bi[ratj]a n dA := A1 ∩ A2. Then a
strategy ri surviving the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure can be characterizedPROPER CONSISTENCY 9
by the property that there exists a belief system with ri ∈ C
ti(ω)
i for some
ω ∈ CKA (cf. AD, Prop. 3). Since [respi] ⊆ Bi[ratj], it follows from Def.
2 that proper rationalizability reﬁnes the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure. The
notation reﬂects that Bi[ratj] can be interpreted as the event that i believes
(with probability one) that j is rational.
Next it is shown that Def. 2 is equivalent to Schuhmacher’s [24] deﬁnition
of proper rationalizability, thereby establishing an epistemic foundation for
the concept that he deﬁnes.
Proposition 2. Consider a ﬁnite strategic two-player game G.A pure
strategy ri for i is used with positive probability in some mixed strategy that
is properly rationalizable according to the deﬁnition of Schuhmacher [24] if
and only if it is properly rationalizable according to Def.2.
Remark 2. Schuhmacher [24] considers a set of type vectors T = T1 × T2,
where each type ti of either player i plays a completely mixed strategy x
ti
i
and has a probability distribution on Sj×Tj, for which the conditional distri-
bution on Sj ×{tj} coincides with x
tj
j whenever the conditional distribution
is deﬁned. He deﬁnes  -proper rationalizability through the  -proper trem-
bling condition, which is satisﬁed by a type ti of player i if  x
ti
i (ri) ≥ x
ti
i (si)
whenever ti prefers ri to si. His formulation implies that all types of a player
agrees not only on the preferences but also on the relative likelihood of the
strategies for any given opponent type. In contrast, Def. 2 of Sect. 4.1
requires the types of a player only to agree on the preferences of any given
opponent type. This diﬀerence implies that expanded type sets must be
constructed for the suﬃciency part of the proof of Prop. 2.
Proof of Prop.2.Suﬃciency. Suppose that r∗
1 is properly rationalizable for 1 ac-





ω∗ ∈ CKAprop. Let, ∀i ∈ N,T 
i := {ti(ω)|ω ∈ CKAprop}. Note that, ∀i ∈ N
and ∀ω ∈ CKAprop, T
ti(ω)
j ⊆ T 
j since CKAprop = KCKAprop ⊆ KiCKAprop.F o r
each type ti of either player i, make as many clones of ti as there are members of
T 
j: ∀i ∈ N, T  
i := {ti(ti,t j)|ti ∈ T 
i and tj ∈ T 
j}, where ti(ti,t j) is the clone of ti
associated with tj.L e tti(ti,t j) “share” the preferences of ti in the sense that
1. the set of opponent types that ti(ti,t j) does not deem Savage-null, T
ti(ti,tj)
j ,




j } (⊆ T  
j since T
ti
j ⊆ T 
j), and
2. the likelihood of (sj,tj(t 
j,t i)) according to  ti(ti,tj) is equal to the likelihood
of (sj,t  
j) according to  ti.
Consider any (t1,t 2) ∈ T 
1 × T 
2. Since CKAprop ⊆ [ui],  ti(ti,tj) can be rep-




i ◦ z = ui and an LPS on
Sj × T
ti(ti,tj)
j . Since CKAprop ⊆ [caui], this LPS yields, for each t 
j ∈ T
ti
j ,ap a r -
tition {E1,...,E L(ti,t 
j)} of Sj ×{ tj(t 
j,t i)}, where (rj,tj(t 
j,t i))   (sj,tj(t 
j,t i))
according to  ti(ti,tj) whenever (rj,tj(t 
j,t i)) ∈ E ,( sj,tj(t 
j,t i)) ∈ E  ,a n d <   .
Since CKAprop ⊆ [respi]a n dtj(t 
j,t i) “shares” the preferences of t 
j,e a c hrj ∈ E 
is a most preferred strategy in E  ∪···∪EL(ti,t 
j) for any   ∈{ 1,...,L(ti,t  
j)}.
By following the suﬃciency part of the proof of Blume et al. ([9], Prop. 5) in their
application of [9], Prop. 1, converging sequences {x
ti(ti,tj)
i (n)}∞





2, 0 2, 0
1, 3 4, 2
1, 3 3, 5
121 3




Figure 2. A centipede game
mixed strategies and {µti(ti,tj)(n)}∞
n=0 of probability distributions on Sj × T  
j can
be constructed for any type ti(ti,t j) ∈ T  
i of either player i, such that, for any n,
1. for any tj(t 
j,t i) ∈ T
ti(ti,tj)
j , the conditional distribution of µti(ti,tj)(n)o n
Sj ×{ tj(t 





2. ti(ti,t j) satisﬁes the  (n)-proper trembling condition, and
3. C
ti
i is the set of most preferred strategies according to µ
ti(ti,tj)
i (n),
and such that  (n) → 0a sn →∞ .A d d t y p e t∗
1 to T  




∗),t2)(n) for some t2 ∈ T 









1 (n) with 0 <γ<1a n dx∗
1(r∗
1)=1 . F o ra n yn,t h e (n)-proper
trembling condition is satisﬁed for all types in T  
1 ∪{ t∗
1} and all types in T  
2 . This
shows that r∗
1 is played with positive probability in some mixed strategy that is
properly rationalizable according to the deﬁnition of Schuhmacher [24].




mixed strategies and {µti(n)}∞
n=0 of probability distributions on Sj×Tj for any type
ti ∈ Ti of either player i, such that, for any n,t h e (n)-proper trembling condition
is satisﬁed for all types in T1 and all types in T2, and such that  (n) → 0a sn →∞ .
By following the necessity part of the proof of Blume et al. ([9], Prop. 5) in their
application of [9], Prop. 2, an LPS on Sj × Tj can be constructed for any type




i (n)(ri) does not converge to 0 as
n →∞ , and such that Ω = Aprop = CKAprop if Ω = S ×T1 × T2. This shows that
any pure strategy played with positive probability in some mixed strategy that is
properly rationalizable according to the deﬁnition of Schuhmacher [24] is properly
rationalizable according to Def. 2.
5. Backward Induction
Consider the centipede game of Fig. 2. The backward induction argument
in this game goes as follows: If 1’s second decision node is reached and 1
chooses a most preferred strategy in the subgame, then 1 will choose D.I f
2 knows/believes this and chooses a most preferred strategy in the subgame
deﬁned by her decision node, then 2 will choose d. If 1 knows/believes this
and chooses a most preferred strategy at the beginning of the game, then 1
will choose D at his ﬁrst decision node.
It has been hard to provide an unquestionable model of interactive epis-
temology that supports this simple backward induction argument (cf. Stal-
naker [28]). E.g. two widely cited and inﬂuential contributions — Aumann
[5] and Ben-Porath [7] — reach opposite conclusions on whether common
knowledge/belief of rationality implies backward induction. The problem in
the centipede game is that if 1 chooses F at his ﬁrst decision node and thusPROPER CONSISTENCY 11
do not play in accordance with backward induction, then 2 may not believe
that 1 will play in accordance with backward induction at 1’s last decision
node. If so, she may choose f, which in turn opens for the possibility that
the strategy FD may be a most preferred strategy for 1.5
In the game of Fig. 2 the backward induction argument corresponds to
iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in the strategic form of
the game (see the right part of Fig. 2): First FF is eliminated for 1, then
f is eliminated for 2, and ﬁnally, FD is eliminated for 1. However, also
for this procedure it is hard to provide a convincing model of interactive
epistemology (cf. Stahl [27]). The problem in the strategic game of Fig. 2
is that the elimination of f in the second round removes the reason why FF
and not FD was eliminated in the ﬁrst round. However, it is exactly since
FF and not FD was eliminated in the ﬁrst round that f can be eliminated
in the second round. And without the elimination of f, FD cannot be
eliminated.
It is straightforward to see how common certain belief of proper consis-
tency implies that players have preferences in accordance with backward
induction in the sense that, in any subgame, the backward induction out-
come is reached if each player chooses a most preferred strategy: Caution
implies that player 1 prefers FD to FF since FD weakly dominates FF.
Since 2 respects the preferences of 1 and, in addition, certainly believes that
1 is cautious, it follows that 2 deems FD inﬁnitely more likely than FF.
This in turn implies that 2 prefers d to f. As a consequence, since 1 respects
the preferences of 2, certainly believes that 2 respects the preferences of 1,
and certainly believes that 2 certainly believes that 1 is cautious, it follows
that 1 deems d inﬁnitely more likely than f. Consequently, 1 prefers D to
FD. Hence, it follows that the players’ preferences over their own strategies
are given by
D   FD  FF
d   f.
Note that if there is common certain belief of proper consistency, then, in
any subgame, the play of most preferred strategies lead to the backward
induction outcome. The remaining part of Sect. 5 shows that this result
holds for any generic extensive game of perfect information.
5.1. Preliminaries. A ﬁnite extensive game of almost perfect information
Γ with 2 players and M − 1 stages can be described as follows. The sets
of histories is determined inductively: The set of histories at the beginning
of the ﬁrst stage 1 is H1 = {∅}.L e t Hm denote the set of histories at
the beginning of stage m.A t h ∈ Hm, let, for each player i, i’s ﬁnite
action set be denoted Ai(h), where i is inactive at h if Ai(h) is a singleton.
5The epistemic analysis of Battigalli & Siniscalchi [6] provides a foundation for the
backward induction outcome in the whole game. Their model of interactive epistemology
does not, however, support the backward induction argument.12 GEIR B. ASHEIM
Write A(h): =A1(h) × A2(h). Deﬁne the set of histories at the beginning
of stage m + 1 as follows: Hm+1 := {(h,a)|h ∈ Hm and a ∈ A(h)}. This
concludes the induction. Let H :=
M−1
m=1 Hm denote the set of subgames
and let Z := HM denote the set of outcomes.
A pure strategy for player i is a function si t h a ta s s i g n sa na c t i o ni nAi(h)
to any h ∈ H.L e t Si denote player i’s ﬁnite set of pure strategies. Let
z : S → Z map strategy vectors into outcomes.6 Then ((Si)i∈N,z)i sa
ﬁnite strategic two-player game form. If, for each player i, i’s payoﬀ in Γ is
determined by the vNM utility function υi : Z → R, then G =( Si,u i)i∈N
is the strategic game corresponding to Γ, where, for each i, ui : S → R is
deﬁned by ui = υi ◦ z. For any h ∈ H ∪ Z, there exists a strategic form
structure: Let S(h)=S1(h) × S2(h) denote the set of strategy vectors that
are consistent with h being reached. If h  is the predecessor of h, then
S(h ) ⊇ S(h). If si ∈ Si and h ∈ H,l e tsi|h denote the strategy in Si(h)
satisfying si|h(h )=si(h )a ta n yh  ∈ H except at h  with S(h ) ⊃ S(h)
where si|h(h ) is dictated by si|h being consistent with h.
A ﬁnite extensive game is of perfect information if, at any h ∈ H, there
exists at most one player that has a non-singleton action set. It is generic if,
for each i, υi(z)  = υi(z ) whenever z and z  are diﬀerent outcomes. Generic
extensive games of perfect information have a unique subgame-perfect equi-
librium. Moreover, in such games the procedure of backward induction
yields in any subgame the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome. If
p denotes the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, then, for any subgame h,
z(p|h) is the backward induction outcome in the subgame h,a n dS(z(p|h)) is
the set of strategy vectors consistent with the backward induction outcome
in the subgame h.
For each type ti of player i,  
ti
Sj(h) is ti’s preferences over i’s pure strate-
gies Si(h)i na n ys u b g a m eh ∈ H.L e t C
ti
i (h): ={ri ∈ Si(h)|∀si ∈
Si(h),r i 
ti
Sj(h)si} denote ti’s set of most preferred strategies in the sub-
game h. Refer to C
ti





i (∅), and write, for any h ∈ H, Ct(h): =C
t1
1 (h) × C
t2
2 (h). By
Lemma 1, if si is most preferred in a subgame h, then si is most preferred
in any later subgame that si is consistent with.
Lemma 1. If si ∈ C
ti
i (h), then si ∈ C
ti
i (h ) for any h  ∈ H with si ∈
Si(h ) ⊆ Si(h).
Proof. Suppose that si is not a most preferred strategy in h . Then there exists ri ∈
Si(h ) such that ri  
ti
Sj(h ) si. It follows from Mailath, Samuelson & Swinkels ([19],
Defs. 2 and 3 and the if-part of Theorem 1) that S(h )i sastrategic independence
for i. Hence, ri can be chosen such that z(ri,s j)=z(si,s j) for all sj ∈ Sj\Sj(h ).
6A pure strategy si ∈ Si can be viewed as an act on Sj that assigns z(si,s j) ∈ Z
to any sj ∈ Sj. The set of pure strategies Si is partitioned into equivalent classes of
acts since a pure strategy si also determines actions in subgames which si prevents from
being reached. Each such equivalent class corresponds to a plan of action in the sense
of Rubinstein [23]. As there is no need here to diﬀerentiate between identical acts, the
concept of a plan of action would have suﬃced.PROPER CONSISTENCY 13
This implies that ri  
ti
Sj(h) si, which contradicts that si is a most preferred strategy
in h.
5.2. Result on Backward Induction. In analogy with Aumann’s [5] The-
orem A, it is established that any vector of most preferred strategies in a
subgame of a generic perfect information game, in a state where there is
common certain belief of proper consistency, leads to the backward induc-
tion outcome in the subgame (Prop. 3). The analogy of Aumann’s Theorem
B — that for any generic perfect information game, common certain belief
of proper consistency is possible; i.e. that the result of Prop. 3 is not empty
— has already been established through Cor. 1 since any extensive game of
(almost) perfect information Γ has a corresponding strategic game G.
Proposition 3. Consider a ﬁnite generic 2-player extensive game of per-
fect information Γ with corresponding strategic game G.If, for some belief
system for G, ω ∈ CKAprop, then, for each h ∈ H, Ct(ω)(h) ⊆ S(z(p|h)),
where p denotes the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Some properties of the certain belief operator (see Sect. 3.3) must be estab-
lished for the proof. It is easy to check that KiΩ=Ωa n dKi∅ = ∅, and, for any
events E and F, KiE∩KiF = Ki(E∩F), KiE ⊆ KiKiE,a n d¬KiE ⊆ Ki(¬KiE),
implying that, for any event E, KiE = KiKiE. Write K0E := E and, for each
g ≥ 1, KgE := KKg−1E. Since Ki(E ∩ F)=KiE ∩ KiF and KiKiE = KiE,i t
follows ∀g ≥ 2, KgE = K1Kg−1E ∩ K2Kg−1E ⊆ K1K1Kg−2E ∩ K2K2Kg−2E =
K1Kg−2E ∩ K2Kg−2E = Kg−1E. The truth axiom (KiE ⊆ E) is not satisﬁed,
since an event can be certainly believed even though the true state is an element




2 is an event
that concerns the type vector, mutual certain belief of Aprop implies that Aprop is












i . Hence, it follows that (i) ∀g ≥ 1, KgAprop ⊆
Kg−1Aprop,a n d(ii) ∃g  ≥ 0 such that KgAprop = CKAprop for g ≥ g  s i n c eΩi s
ﬁnite.
In view of these properties, it is suﬃcient to show for any g =0 ,...,M−2 that
if there exists a belief system with ω ∈ KgAprop, then Ct(ω)(h) ⊆ S(z(p|h)) for any
h ∈ HM−1−g. This is established by induction.
(g =0 )L e th ∈ HM−1. First, consider j with a singleton action set at h. Then
trivially C
tj
j (h)=Sj(h)=Sj(z(p|h)). Now, consider i with a non-singleton action
set at h; since Γ has perfect information, there is at most one such i.L e tti = ti(ω)
for some ω ∈ K0Aprop = Aprop. Then it follows that C
ti
i (h)=Si(z(p|h)) since Γ is
generic and ω ∈ Aprop ⊆ [ui] ∩ [caui].
(g =1 ,...,M − 2) Suppose that it has been established for g  =0 ,...,g− 1
that if there exists a belief system with ω ∈ Kg
 
Aprop, then Ct(ω)(h ) ⊆ S(z(p|h ))
for any h  ∈ HM−1−g
 
.L e th ∈ HM−1−g. First, consider j with a singleton action
set at h.L e t tj = tj(ω) for some ω ∈ Kg−1Aprop. Then, by Lemma 1 and the
premise, Sj(h)=Sj(h,a)a n dC
tj
j (h) ⊆ C
tj
j (h,a) ⊆ Sj(z(p|(h,a))) if a is a feasible




a Sj(z(p|(h,a))) ⊆ Sj(z(p|h)). Now,
consider i with a non-singleton action set at h; since Γ has perfect information, there





a Sj(z(p|(h,a))) whenever tj ∈ T
ti
j since ω ∈ KgAprop ⊆14 GEIR B. ASHEIM
KiKg−1Aprop.L e t si ∈ Si(h) be a strategy that diﬀers from pi|h by assigning
a diﬀerent action at h (i.e., z(si,p j|h)  = z(p|h)a n dsi(h )=pi|h(h ) whenever
Si(h) ⊃ Si(h )). Write xSj for the act on Sj that pi|h can be viewed as, and write
ySj for the act on Sj that si can be viewed as. Let x and y be the acts on Sj ×Tj
that satisfy x(sj,t j)=xSj(sj)a n dy(sj,t j)=ySj(sj) for all (sj,t j). Then,
x∩aSj(z(p|(h,a)))×Tj strongly dominates y∩aSj(z(p|(h,a)))×Tj
by backward induction since Γ is generic and ω ∈ KgAprop ⊆ [ui]. Since C
tj
j (h) ⊆ 
a Sj(z(p|(h,a))) whenever tj ∈ T
ti










and, thus, ω ∈ KgAprop ⊆ [respi] implies that
x  
ti
Sj(h)×{tj} y, x  
ti
Sj(h)×Tj y and xSj  
ti
Sj(h) ySj.
By Lemma 1 and the premise that C
ti
i (h,a) ⊆ Si(z(p|(h,a))) if a is a feasible action
vector at h, it follows that C
ti
i (h) ⊆ Si(z(p|h)).
Remark 3. The proof of Prop. 3 illustrates the importance of deﬁning
proper rationalizability by imposing common certain belief of proper consis-
tency, where ‘certain belief’ of an event means that the complement of the
event is deemed Savage-null. Common belief of proper consistency, where
‘belief’ is used in the sense of ‘belief with probability one’, would not imply
backward induction. It is straightforward to show that the belief system
for a four-legged centipede game presented in Table 2 of Asheim [3] consti-
tutes an example where common belief of proper consistency is consistent
with vectors of most preferred strategies that do not lead to the backward
induction outcome.
6. Induction in a Trade Game
The games of Figs. 1 and 2 have in common that the properly rationaliz-
able strategies coincide with those surviving iterated (maximal) elimination
of weakly dominated strategies. The present section shows that this con-
clusion does not hold in general. Rather, it will be argued that the concept
of proper rationalizability can be used to test the robustness of iterated
(maximal) elimination of weakly dominated strategies and other inductive
procedures.
Figure 3 illustrates a simpliﬁed version of a trade game introduced by
Sonsino, Erev & Gilat [25] for the purpose of experimental study; Søvik [26]
has subsequently repeated their experiment in alternative designs. The two
players consider to trade a good and have a common and uniform prior over
the state of the good. There are no gains from trade. If the state of the
good is a, then 1 looses 9 and 2 wins 9 if trade occurs. If the state of the
good is b, then 1 wins 6 and 2 looses 6 if trade occurs. Finally, if the state
of the good is c, then 1 looses 3 and 2 wins 3 if trade occurs. Player 1 is







Figure 3. A trade game





-2, 2 -1, 1 -1, 1 0, 0
-3, 3 -3, 3 0, 0 0, 0
1, -1 2, -2 -1, 1 0, 0
0, 0 0, 0 0, 0 0, 0
Figure 4. The strategic form of the trade game
in the set {b,c} on the other. Player 2 is informed of whether the state of
the good is in the set {a,b} on the one hand, or equal to c on the other.
As a function of their information, each player can announce to accept
trade or not. For player 1 the strategy YN means to accept trade if informed
of a and not to accept trade if informed of {b,c}, etc. For player 2 the
strategy yn means to accept trade if informed of {a,b} and not to accept
trade if informed of c, etc. Trade occurs if and only if both players have
accepted trade. This yields the strategic game of Figure 4.
6.1. An Inductive Procedure. If player 2 naively believes that player 1
is equally likely to accept trade when informed of a as when informed of
{b,c}, then 2 will wish to accept trade when informed of {a,b}. However,
the following, seemingly intuitive, inductive procedure appears to indicate
that 2 should never accept trade if informed of {a,b}: Player 1 should not
accept trade when informed of a since he cannot win by doing so. This
eliminates his strategies YY and YN. Player 2, realizing this, should never
accept trade when informed of {a,b}, since — as long as 1 never accepts
trade when informed of a — she cannot win by doing so. This eliminates
her strategies yy and yn. This in turn means that player 1, realizing this,
should never accept trade when informed of {b,c},s i n c e—a sl o n ga s2
never accepts trade when informed of {a,b} — he cannot win by doing so.
This eliminates his strategy NY. This inductive argument corresponds to
iterated (maximal) elimination of weakly dominated strategies, except that
the latter procedure eliminates 2’s strategies yn and nn in the ﬁrst round.
The argument seems to imply that player 2 should never accept trade if
informed of {a,b} and that player 1 should never accept trade if informed
of {b,c}. Is this a robust conclusion?
6.2. Proper Rationalizability in the Trade Game. The strategic game
of Fig. 4has a set of Nash equilibria that includes the pure strategy vectors16 GEIR B. ASHEIM
(NN,ny)a n d( NN,nn), and a set of perfect equilibria that includes the
pure strategy vector (NN,ny). However, there is a unique proper equilib-
rium where player 1 plays NN with probability one, and where player 2
mixes between yy with probability 1/5a n dny with probability 4/5. It is
instructive to see why the pure strategy vector (NN,ny)i snot ap r o p e r
equilibrium. If 1 assigns probability one to 2 playing ny, then he prefers
YNto NY (since the more serious mistake to avoid is to accept trade when
being informed of {b,c}). However, if 2 respects 1’s preferences and cer-
tainly believes that 1 prefers YN to NY, then she will herself prefer yy to
ny, undermining (NN,ny) as a proper equilibrium. The mixture between
yy and ny in the proper equilibrium is constructed so that 1 is indiﬀerent
between YN and NY.
From Prop. 1 it follows that both yy and yn are properly rationalizable
strategies for 2. Moreover, if 1 certainly believes that 2 is of a type with only
yy as a most preferred strategy, then NY is a most preferred strategy for 1,
implying that NY in addition to NN is a properly rationalizable strategy for
1. That these strategies are in fact properly rationalizable is veriﬁed by the
belief system of Table 1. In the table the preferences of each type ti of any




i ◦z = ui
and a 4-level LPS on Sj ×{t 
j,t   
j}, with the ﬁrst numbers in the parantheses
expressing primary probability distributions, the second numbers expressing
secondary probability distributions, etc. With Ω = S ×{ t 
1,t   
1}×{ t 
2,t   
2},
it follows that Ω = Aprop = CKAprop. Since each type’s preferences over
his/her own strategies are given by
t 
1 : NN   YN  NY   YY
t  
1 : NY   NN   YY   YN
t 
2 : ny   nn   yy   yn
t  
2 : yy   yn   ny   nn,
it follows that NY and NN are properly rationalizable for player 1 and yy
and ny are properly rationalizable for player 2. Note that YY and YN for
player 1 and yn and nn for player 2 cannot be properly rationalizable since
these strategies are weakly dominated and, thus, cannot be most preferred
strategies for cautious players.
The lesson to be learned from this analysis, is that is not obvious that
deductive reasoning should lead players to refrain from accepting trade in the
trade game.7 By comparison to Prop. 3, the analysis can be used to support
the argument that backward induction in generic perfect information games
is more convincing than the inductive procedure for the trade game discussed
in Sect. 6.1.
7The experiments by Sonsino et al. [25] and Søvik [26] show that some subjects do in
fact accept trade in a slightly more complicated version of this game.PROPER CONSISTENCY 17
Table 1. A belief system for the trade game
t 
1 t 
2 t  
2 t  
1 t 
2 t  
2
yy (0,0,1,0) (0,0,0,0) yy (0,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0)
yn (0,0,0,1) (0,0,0,0) yn (0,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0)
ny (1,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0) ny (0,0,0,0) (0,0,1,0)
nn (0,1,0,0) (0,0,0,0) nn (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,1)
t 
2 t 
1 t  
1 t  
2 t 
1 t  
1
YY (0,0,0,0) (0,0,1,0) YY (0,0,0,1) (0,0,0,0)
YN (0,0,0,0) (0,0,0,1) YN (0,1,0,0) (0,0,0,0)
NY (0,0,0,0) (1,0,0,0) NY (0,0,1,0) (0,0,0,0)
NN (0,0,0,0) (0,1,0,0) NN (1,0,0,0) (0,0,0,0)
7. Conclusion
Iterated (maximal) elimination of weakly dominated strategies, backward
induction in perfect information games, and other inductive procedures have
been subject to critical scrutiny during the last few years. The present paper
shows how proper rationalizability — based on the imposition of common
certain belief of the proper consistency of preferences with the game and the
preferences of the opponent — can be used to test the robustness of such
procedures.
It has been shown how proper rationalizability in general supports back-
ward induction in generic perfect information games with 2 players. How-
ever, in other games — like the trade game of Sect. 6 — the concept of
proper rationalizability points to fundamental reasons why deductive rea-
soning may not coincide with the outcome of iterated (maximal) elimination
of weakly dominated strategies.
Appendix. The Decision-Theoretic Framework
The purpose of this appendix is to present the decision-theoretic terminology,
notation and results utilized and referred to in the main text.
Consider a decision maker under uncertainty. Let F be a ﬁnite set of states,
where the decision maker is uncertain about what state in F will be realized. Let Z
be a ﬁnite set of outcomes. In the tradition of Anscombe & Aumann [1], the decision
maker is endowed with a binary relation over all functions that to each element of
F assigns an objective randomization on Z. Any such function xF : F → ∆(Z)i s
called an act on F. Write xF and yF for acts on F.Acomplete and transitive binary
relation on the set of acts on F is denoted by  F, where xF  F yF means that xF
is preferred or indiﬀerent to yF. As usual, let  F (preferred to)a n d∼F (indiﬀerent
to) denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of  F. A binary relation  F on
the set of acts on F is said to satisfy
• objective independence if x 
F  F (respectively ∼F) x  
F iﬀ γx 
F +(1−γ)yF  F
(respectively ∼F) γx  
F +(1−γ)yF, whenever 0 <γ<1a n dyF is arbitrary.
• nontriviality if there exist xF and yF such that xF  F yF.18 GEIR B. ASHEIM
If E ⊆ F,l e txE denote the restriction of xF to E. Deﬁne the conditional binary
relation  E by x 
F  E x  
F if, for arbitrary yF,( x 
E,y−E)  F (x  
E,y−E), where −E
denotes F\E. Say that the state f ∈ F is Savage-null if xF ∼{f} yF for all acts
xF and yF on F. A binary relation  F is said to satisfy
• conditional continuity if, ∀f ∈ F, there exist 0 <γ<δ<1 such that
δx 
F+(1−δ)x  
F  {f} yF  {f} γx 
F+(1−γ)x  
F whenever x 
F  {f} yF  {f} x  
F.
• non-null state independence if xF  {e} yF iﬀ xF  {f} yF whenever e and f
are not Savage-null and xF and yF satisfy xF(e)=xF(f)a n dyF(e)=yF(f).
If e, f ∈ F, then e is deemed inﬁnitely more likely than f (e   f)i fe is not
Savage-null and xF  {e} yF implies (x−{f},x 
{f})  {e,f} (y−{f},y 
{f}) for all x 
F ,
y 
F . According to this deﬁnition, f may, but need not, be Savage-null if e   f.
If υ : Z → R is a vNM utility function, abuse notation slightly by writing
υ(x)=

z∈Z x(z)υ(z) whenever x ∈ ∆(Z) is an objective randomization. Say that
xE strongly dominates yE w.r.t. υ if, ∀f ∈ E, υ(xE(f)) >υ (yE(f)). Say that
xE weakly dominates yE w.r.t. υ if, ∀f ∈ E, υ(xE(f)) ≥ υ(yE(f)), with strict
inequality for some e ∈ E. Say that  F is admissible on E ( = ∅)i fxF  F yF
whenever xE weakly dominates yE.
The following representation result due to Blume, Brandenburger & Dekel ([8],
Theorem 3.1) can now be stated. It requires the notion of a lexicographic probability
system (LPS) which consists of L levels of subjective probability distributions: If
L ≥ 1 and, ∀  ∈{ 1,...,L}, µ  ∈ ∆(F), then λ =( µ1,...,µL)i sa nL P So nF.
Let L∆(F) denote the set of LPSs on F, and let, for two utility vectors v and w,
v ≥L w denote that, whenever w  >v  , there exists    < such that v   >w   .
Proposition A1. If  F is complete and transitive, and satisﬁes objective indepen-
dence, nontriviality, conditional continuity, and non-null state independence, then
there exists a vNM utility function υ : Z → R and an LPS λ =( µ1,...,µL) ∈ L∆(F)











If F = F1 × F2 and  F is a binary relation on the set of acts on F, then say
that  F1 is the marginal of  F on F1 if, xF1  F1 yF1 iﬀ xF  F yF whenever
xF1(f1)=xF(f1,f 2)a n dyF1(f1)=yF(f1,f 2) for all (f1,f 2).
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